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For nearly twenty years after the Supreme Court’s 1966 ruling in the landmark
case Miranda v. Arizona,1 whenever criminal suspects were subjected to
custodial interrogation by law enforcement without first having been advised of
safeguards to protect their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the suspects’
responses were generally inadmissible at trial.2 However, in its 1984 decision
New York v. Quarles,3 the Supreme Court announced the public safety
exception, under which statements made by un-Mirandized suspects can still be
admissible when the statements were made in response to questions reasonably
asked to protect the safety of the arresting officers or the general public.4 During
investigation of terrorism cases, law enforcement agencies have begun to extend
the time of un-Mirandized questioning of suspects, with the hope that courts will
find that the public safety exception makes the suspects’ statements admissible
in the ensuing prosecutions.5
This Article argues that in announcing the public safety exception, the Court
implicitly analogized the role of police interrogation in situations implicating
public safety (which justifies the un-Mirandized questioning and so makes the
suspects’ responses admissible) to the actions of criminal defendants in
situations of self-defense and defense of others (justifying the defendants’
actions and so avoiding liability for violence). Recognizing the implicit analogy
can provide guidance on the applicability and limits of the public safety
exception and related issues, such as the rescue doctrine. Moreover, the
comparison can draw upon the reasoning involved in recognizing battered
woman syndrome, which has been used to broaden the circumstances under
which suspects might have reasonably acted in self-defense. By analogy with
evaluating the reasonableness of self-defense involving battered woman
syndrome, evaluating the admissibility of terrorism suspects’ un-Mirandized
statements under the public safety exception might be influenced by the
frequency and severity of terrorist activities that took place in the time leading
up to the arrest of the suspects.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, THE MIRANDA
REQUIREMENTS, AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE MIRANDA RULE
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides a privilege against
self-incrimination, stating in relevant part that no person “shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”6 In 1966, the Supreme Court
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 469, 654 (1984) (describing the effect of Miranda’s
holding on statements made in “inherently coercive” circumstances).
3. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
4. Id. at 655‒58.
5. See David T. Hartmann, comment, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda and the War
on Terror: Desperate Times Do Not Always Call for Desperate Measures, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R.
L.J. 219, 234, 241‒44 (2012).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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decided the Miranda case, which required the use of procedural measures to
safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against incriminating himself.7
The Court explained that when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation8
by law enforcement,
[he] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.9
The Court also stated that other safeguards may be used for protecting the
privilege, “so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in
informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous
opportunity to exercise it.”10
Failure to administer the Miranda warnings during investigation of a crime
made the suspect’s statements inadmissible in the ensuing trial.11 Explaining
why the suspect needs such warnings during pretrial questioning by law
enforcement, the Court declared that,
[w]ithout the protections flowing from adequate warnings and the
rights of counsel, “all the careful safeguards erected around the giving
of testimony, whether by an accused or any other witness, would
become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling
possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been
obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police.”12
Thus, interrogation is not allowed to begin or continue if the suspect indicates
that he does not wish to be questioned.13 Similarly, if the suspect indicates that
he wants to speak with an attorney before making a statement to police,
interrogation cannot begin or continue until the suspect has had the opportunity
to consult with counsel.14

7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478‒79 (1966).
8. The Court defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.” Id. at 444.
9. Id. at 479. The Miranda decision referred back to the Court’s previous decision in
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440. In Escobedo, the
Court found the police committed a violation of the Sixth Amendment when they questioned a
suspect, refused his request to speak with his lawyer, and did not advise him of his right to remain
silent; accordingly, the Court held that statements the suspect made to the police during the
interrogation were not admissible against him at the subsequent criminal trial. 378 U.S. at 490‒91.
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490.
11. Id. at 444.
12. Id. at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
13. Id. at 445.
14. Id. at 444‒45.
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But in Quarles, the Supreme Court announced a “public safety” exception to
the Miranda requirements.15 Quarles dealt with circumstances in which a rape
victim approached police, described her assailant, and stated that he had gone
into a nearby supermarket while armed with a gun.16 After chasing the suspect
through the supermarket, an officer stopped him, frisked him, and “discovered
that he was wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty.”17 The officer
handcuffed the suspect and asked about the gun’s location without first advising
the suspect of his Miranda rights.18 The Court held that the suspect’s indication
of the gun’s location among some empty cartons was admissible even though
the suspect had not been advised of his Miranda rights before making the
statement.19 The Court also held that the questioning the police undertook
before advising the suspect of his Miranda rights did not taint the admissibility
of further statements the suspect made after being advised of his rights.20 The
Quarles majority concluded that during the act of capturing the suspect, the
police “were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the
whereabouts of [the] gun” because the missing gun “obviously posed more than
one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer
or employee might later come upon it.”21
In creating the public safety exception, the Quarles majority emphasized that,
as a practical matter, arresting officers would probably act from a combination
of mixed motives, including a desire to safeguard their own safety and that of
others: “Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in [the arresting officer’s]
position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable
motives—their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to
obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect.”22 The majority then stated that
15. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655‒56 (1984).
16. Id. at 651‒52.
17. Id. at 652.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 652, 659‒60.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 657. However, the dissent contested the majority’s characterization of the facts by
noting that, “[c]ontrary to the majority’s speculations, . . . Quarles was not believed to have, nor
did he in fact have, an accomplice to come to his rescue. When the questioning began, the arresting
officers were sufficiently confident of their safety to put away their guns.” Id. at 675 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The dissent further observed that the incident occurred late at night, when “no
customers or employees were wandering about the store in danger of coming across Quarles’
discarded weapon.” Id. at 676.
22. Id. at 656 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). Thus, in commenting on the Quarles
decision, one author has asserted that “[a] good analogy to police action in an emergency situation
is self-defense, where there is no requirement that the actor’s sole motive in employing force be
self-protection.” William T. Pizzi, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in a Rescue Situation,
76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567, 583 (1985). Pizzi further notes that, according to the drafters
of the Model Penal Code, a situation of mixed motives does not invalidate a defendant’s claim of
self-defense. Id. at 583 n.113 (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Tentative Draft No. 8,
1958)).
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the availability of a public safety exception “does not depend upon the
motivation of the individual officers involved” and that the situation facing the
officers was a “kaleidoscopic” one demanding immediate response.23 The
majority also declared that, “[w]hatever the motivation of individual officers in
such a situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda
require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”24 The
majority described the public safety exception as a “narrow exception to the
Miranda rule” and further declared a faith that “police officers can and will
distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own
safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit
testimonial evidence from a suspect.”25
But in arguing against the creation of the public safety exception, the Quarles
dissent observed that strict adherence to the Miranda rule would not limit the
scope of interrogation that law enforcement agents could undertake to protect
the public:
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise imminently
imperiled, the police are free to interrogate suspects without advising
them of their constitutional rights. . . . [N]othing in the Fifth
Amendment or our decision in Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort
of emergency questioning. All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the
introduction of coerced statements at trial.26
Thus, closely applying the Miranda requirements would merely make the results
of un-Mirandized questioning unavailable for the purpose of prosecuting the
defendant.27
The characterization of the precise status of the Miranda requirements has
changed over time. In the Miranda case itself, the Court referred to its own
previous decisions that “recognized both the dangers of interrogation and the
appropriateness of prophylaxis stemming from the very fact of interrogation
itself.”28 Apparently picking up on the Miranda decision’s reference to
“prophylaxis,” the Quarles Court referred to the underlying facts in Quarles as
“a situation where concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to
the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda.”29 The
Quarles decision further found that “prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore
are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but are instead measures

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656.
Id.
Id. at 658‒59.
Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966).
Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653.
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to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.”30
The Quarles majority therefore concluded that “the need for answers to
questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need
for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against
self-incrimination.”31 But the 2000 case of Dickerson v. United States32 declared
that Miranda did not merely provide prophylactic guidelines, but rather
“announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede
legislatively.”33 The Dickerson majority stated that exceptions to the Miranda
rule—such as the public safety exception created in Quarles—illustrate the
normal workings of constitutional law as new situations arise.34 Thus, the
Supreme Court has most recently treated the Miranda requirements as a
constitutional rule with limited exceptions.
The public safety exception has applied to the locations of various types of
weapons and other dangerous objects. As in the Quarles decision, subsequent
cases have often applied the exception to situations where the police ask suspects
about the locations of firearms.35 Courts have also found that the exception
applies to law enforcement questions about the locations of knives.36 In
addition, the public safety exception has applied to questioning drug crime
30. Id. at 654 (citation omitted). Moreover, the dissent also described the Miranda
requirements as a “prophylactic barrier” and a “prophylactic rule.” See id. at 681 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
31. Id. at 657 (majority opinion).
32. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
33. Id. at 444.
34. Id. at 441. The other exception noted by the Dickerson majority occurred in Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 (1971), where the Supreme Court found that a suspect’s unMirandized statements during custodial interrogation were admissible for purposes of impeaching
the credibility of the suspect’s trial testimony. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. During its case in chief,
the Harris prosecution had not attempted to use the suspect’s statements. Harris, 401 U.S. at 223‒
24.
35. See, e.g., Allen v. Roe, 305 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the public safety
exception applied when the gun was not at the scene where the crime was committed and also was
not in the suspect’s possession when he was arrested); United States v. Kelly, 991 F.2d 1308, 1311,
1313 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the public safety exception applied because, before police
conducted a consensual pat-down search for drugs, the suspect removed several items—including
bullets—from his pants pocket, thus raising concern about whether he was carrying a gun).
36. See, e.g., People v. Cole, 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 51‒52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that,
having been informed the suspect had a knife that was not found during a pat-down search, the
arresting officer’s question was “reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety” because “[h]e
was . . . confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining where the knife was. Until the
knife was discovered, it posed a threat to public safety.”). However, the Cole dissent rejected the
idea that the discarded knife presented a threat to public safety. See id. at 58‒59 (White, J.,
dissenting). The dissent further urged that the public safety exception should apply only to the sort
of circumstances that were present in the Quarles case: “a factual context of a firearm in places of
public at large accommodation.” Id. at 58. See also People v. Waiters, 502 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (explaining that when police arrived, the suspect—without being
questioned—stated that she stabbed the victim in self-defense; the public safety exception applied
to the suspect’s identification of the knife’s location in response to police questioning).
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suspects about whether they are carrying hypodermic needles.37 The public
safety exception has also applied to questioning suspects about the location of
bombs or bomb components,38 and to questioning a suspect about the location
of vials containing bubonic plague bacteria.39
The suspect’s status as someone involved in actions that typically involve
possession of dangerous weapons—particularly if he is believed to be a drug
dealer—has sometimes helped the prosecution establish the applicability of the
public safety exception.40 However, attempts to invoke the public safety
exception have failed when courts have found there was no immediate necessity
to ask the suspect about dangerous items. For example, the public safety
exception did not apply to a suspect’s statement about the location of guns in a
house when law enforcement agents had “performed two sweeps of the house[,]
. . . had both occupants of the house in handcuffs[,]” and the agents asked only
about guns inside the house; these facts undercut the prosecution’s argument that
members of the public outside the house were endangered by the possibility of
finding the suspect’s firearms.41 Similarly, the public safety exception did not
apply when officers handcuffed a suspect in a private residence in which it had
been confirmed no one else was present at the time, the suspect was wearing
only his underwear, and “[n]umerous officers participated in the arrest, fanning
out through the apartment.”42 The public safety exception was also inapplicable
when law enforcement agents arrested a suspect outside his house and
37. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the
public safety exception applied when, before searching the suspect, the police officer asked whether
“he had any drugs or needles on his person,” and the suspect responded by saying, “‘No, I don’t
use drugs, I sell them’”). In Carrillo, the police officer testified that, in previous searches, “he had
been poked by needles and suffered headaches and skin irritation from contact with illegal drugs.”
Id. at 1049 n.1.
38. United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that the public
safety exception applied when police officers questioned suspects about pipe bombs found in their
apartment); United States v. Dodge, 852 F. Supp. 139, 142 (D. Conn. 1994) (concluding that the
public safety exception applied when a police officer questioned a suspect about the location of
bomb components that easily could have been assembled).
39. United States v. Harris, 961 F. Supp. 1127, 1129‒30, 1134 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 608, 613 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the
public safety exception applied to the arresting officer’s question about whether weapons were in
the vicinity; the involved officers reasonably believed they needed the information to protect their
own safety because the suspect had previously been convicted of assault and was known to be a
drug dealer, and another individual was at the apartment when the suspect was arrested); United
States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 154‒55 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the public safety exception
applied because the arresting officer reasonably believed that the heroin dealer might be “carrying
sharp objects or firearms”); United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
that the public safety exception justified a detective’s question about whether the suspect had a gun
because “drug dealers are known to arm themselves, particularly when making a sale, in order to
protect themselves, their goods and the large quantities of cash often associated with such
transactions”).
41. United States v. Brathwaite, 458 F.3d 376, 382‒83 n.8 (5th Cir. 2006).
42. United States v. Salahuddin, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142‒43 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
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questioned him about whether there were any traps or explosives inside the
house; although the agents testified that they had information about the house
having such dangerous items, they conceded that providing the Miranda
warnings would not have done harm in that situation, they did not need to enter
the suspect’s residence immediately, and they did not convey the information
about the traps and explosives to the officers who entered the residence.43
Courts are divided about whether the public safety exception applies when the
risk threatens a specific individual rather than the more general public at large.
Some have declared that the public safety exception applies in such
circumstances.44 However, others have stated that the admissibility of a
suspect’s un-Mirandized statements made in response to officers’ questioning
aimed at saving specific, identified individuals should be analyzed under a
separate “private safety exception” or “rescue doctrine” rather than under the
public safety exception.45 For example, the rescue doctrine may apply to law
enforcement officers questioning a suspect about the location of a missing
person whom the police have not yet located.46 Moreover, at least one court has
held that both the public safety exception and the rescue doctrine apply to
questions prompted by a concern for the suspect’s own safety.47
In creating the public safety exception, the Quarles decision emphasized the
“immediate necessity” of obtaining information from the suspect.48 However,
subsequent cases have sometimes applied the public safety exception to justify
the admissibility of a suspect’s statements made in response to law enforcement
questions asked at a point removed from the immediate place and time of the
arrest.49 Moreover, the rescue doctrine has been used to justify the admissibility

43. United States v. Rumble, 714 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390, 392‒93 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 960 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding that the
public safety exception applied when an officer asked a suspect about the safety of person(s) “inside
the [suspect’s] house”); Bailey v. State, 763 N.E.2d 998, 1000‒02 (Ind. 2002) (internal quotation
omitted) (holding that the public safety exception applied when an officer asked a suspect about
the location of a murder victim whose death had not yet been confirmed).
45. See, e.g., State v. Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (“The companion to
the public safety exception must be a private safety exception, whether labelled as such or as a
‘rescue doctrine.’ In our calculus the possible imminent loss of the life of a known and identifiable
individual is entitled to the same weight as the public safety.”).
46. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 123‒24 (Cal. 2009) (concluding that the rescue
doctrine applied when the suspect was questioned about the location of a kidnapping victim);
Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d at 71‒72, 76 (determining that the rescue doctrine applied when a suspect was
questioned about the location of his missing son).
47. See Benson v. State, 698 So. 2d 333, 333, 336‒37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that
the public safety exception and the rescue doctrine applied when the suspect started eating rocks of
crack cocaine during arrest, police asked how many he had eaten, and an officer labeled the
situation an “emergency” because of the possibility that the suspect could overdose).
48. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 702 F.3d 89, 90‒91, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that
the public safety exception applied when a suspect was arrested outside his apartment building and
was questioned at the police station “an hour or more after his arrest” because the suspect’s missing
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of a suspect’s statements in response to custodial interrogation that occurred
long after the victim was first missing.50 Thus, case law suggests that in at least
some circumstances, the exceptions to the Miranda rule may apply for an
extended period rather than only for a short, discrete window of time when
questioning the suspect.
II. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DRAWING ON CRIMINAL LAW: THE PUBLIC SAFETY
EXCEPTION IMPLICITLY ANALOGIZES THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS WHO INTERROGATE SUSPECTS TO THAT OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
IN SITUATIONS OF SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF OTHERS
The Quarles majority’s focus on law enforcement officers questioning
suspects to preserve the officers’ “own safety [and] the safety of others”51 is an
implicit invocation of the criminal law doctrines of self-defense and defense of
others. In order for the public safety exception to justify the use of an unMirandized suspect’s statements, there must have been an “immediate
necessity” to obtain information from the suspect, and the questions directed to
the suspect must have been “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety.”52 Similarly, in the realm of criminal law, one jurisdiction has
summarized that an actor may “use physical force upon another person when
and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself
or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use
of unlawful physical force by such other person.”53
The wording of the public safety exception is nearly identical to wording for
doctrines of self-defense and defense of others. In formulating the public safety
exception, the Quarles Court implemented the phrases “immediate necessity”54
and “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety”55 and referenced
police officers asking “questions necessary to secure their own safety or the
safety of the public.”56 This language is very similar to the terms used to
describe criminal law justifications for use of force in situations of self-defense
and defense of others: “imminent”57 and “reasonably believes such to be
necessary to defend himself or a third person.”58 In effect, the Quarles decision
pistol posed a threat, especially in light of the fact that the apartment was close to a playground and
other public facilities).
50. See, e.g., Davis, 208 P.3d at 122‒23 (explaining that the suspect responded to custodial
interrogation sixty-two days after a kidnapping victim’s disappearance).
51. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656.
52. Id. at 656‒57.
53. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47 (N.Y. 1986) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)
(McKinney 2004)).
54. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657.
55. Id. at 656.
56. Id. at 659.
57. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 47 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)).
58. Id.
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imported the criminal law doctrines of self-defense and defense of others into
the field of criminal procedure. In criminal law, the doctrines of self-defense
and defense of others justify conduct that would otherwise result in liability for
the defendant; likewise, in criminal procedure, the public safety exception
justifies law enforcement interrogation of a suspect that would otherwise make
the suspects’ statements subject to the exclusionary rule at trial.59
A. Results of Applying Self-Defense and Defense of Others Concepts to the
Miranda Requirement Exceptions
Further examining the criminal law doctrines of self-defense and defense of
others may shed light on the proper contours of the exceptions to the criminal
procedure Miranda requirements. Under the right circumstances, a defendant
can deploy an affirmative defense of necessity for using physical force to defend
himself or others.60 One may be justified in using physical force in self-defense
or defense of another person if the actor has a reasonable belief that such force
is needed to defend against an attacker’s “imminent use of unlawful physical
force.”61 In addition, the actor must not have been responsible for creating the
confrontation.62 One court has given the following summary of the necessary
conditions to support the defendant’s argument of self-defense involving deadly
force:
(1) The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself
in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily
harm from his assailant or potential assailant;
(2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this danger;
(3) The accused claiming the right of self defense must not have been
the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and
(4) The force used must have not been unreasonable and excessive,
that is, the force must not have been more force than the exigency
demanded.63
The public safety exception to the Miranda requirements may apply when law
enforcement officers question a suspect in a situation that presents an immediate
threat to the officers’ own safety.64 This is the criminal procedure equivalent to
the criminal law doctrine of self-defense outlined above: the arresting officers
59. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651. More generally expounding on the relationship between
criminal law and criminal procedure, one commentator stated that “constitutional criminal
procedure is a species of substantive criminal law for the police.” Carol S. Steiker, CounterRevolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 435, 439 (1997).
60. See, e.g., State v. Williford, 551 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (Ohio 1990).
61. See, e.g., Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 47 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)); Williford, 551
N.E.2d at 1281 (explaining that one may use force in defense of a family member to the same extent
that would be justified in a self-defense situation).
62. Williford, 551 N.E.2d at 1281.
63. Watkins v. State, 613 A.2d 379, 384 (Md. 1992).
64. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656.
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may ask questions to obtain information that is immediately necessary to
preserving their own safety, and the public safety exception prevents the
exclusionary rule from making the suspect’s answers inadmissible at trial.
The public safety exception may also apply when officers question a suspect
in a situation that poses an immediate danger to the general public.65 Somewhat
similarly, the rescue doctrine exception to the Miranda requirements applies to
law enforcement officers’ questioning of a suspect when a specific individual’s
safety is at risk.66 Together, these situations present a criminal procedure
analogue to the criminal law doctrine of defense of others that was summarized
at the start of this subsection: officers may ask questions to obtain information
that is immediately necessary for dealing with threats to the safety of other
people, and the public safety exception and the rescue doctrine can prevent the
exclusionary rule from making the suspect’s answers inadmissible at trial. In
summary, as in situations of self-defense or defense of others—where the use of
force is justified only when the actor reasonably believes there is an imminent
danger that must be dealt with by force67—the Miranda rule exceptions apply
only when law enforcement officers encounter an “immediate necessity” to “ask
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”68
The nature of the suspect’s occupation may play a role in determining whether
law enforcement officers reasonably believed they needed to protect their own
safety by asking questions of the suspect. For example, the public safety
exception applied when officers arrested and questioned suspects known to be
drug dealers because such suspects typically carry weapons; therefore, the
questions were aimed at securing the officers’ own safety.69 The public safety
exception has also applied to questioning drug crime suspects before searching
them in order to protect officers from being harmed by implements such as
hypodermic needles that are common in the use of illegal drugs.70 However, law
enforcement agents’ assertion of an immediate necessity to protect themselves
from harm may be undercut if their conduct is inconsistent with that assertion,
such as when officers asked a suspect about traps or explosives in his house but
then did not convey the resulting information about such dangerous items to
officers who entered the house to conduct a search.71

65. Id.
66. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 122‒24 (Cal. 2009); State v. Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d
69, 76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
67. See, e.g., Watkins, 613 A.2d at 384; People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47 (N.Y. 1986);
Williford, 851 N.E.2d at 1281.
68. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656‒57.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 613 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 (7th Cir.
1989).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994).
71. United States v. Rumble, 714 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390, 392‒93 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
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B. Analogizing to Battered Woman Syndrome Could Extend the Range of
Circumstances to Which the Public Safety Exception Applies
In a majority of jurisdictions within the United States, expert testimony about
battered woman syndrome can be admissible as relevant to a defendant’s theory
of self-defense.72 Less frequently, battered woman syndrome can be invoked in
support of a defendant’s theory of defense of others.73 A few jurisdictions treat
battered woman syndrome testimony as relevant to a defense of insanity; 74
however, the insanity defense is not relevant to this Article, so this subsection
focuses on how battered woman syndrome’s relationship to the concept of selfdefense can contribute to understanding the scope of the Miranda exceptions.
In particular, analogizing to battered woman syndrome suggests that under some
circumstances, law enforcement officers might reasonably believe that they face
an immediate necessity to obtain information from a terrorism suspect, even
under circumstances that at first glance do not seem to support a finding of
immediate necessity.
Battered woman syndrome is a psychological explanation for the conduct of
some women in abusive relationships, including why someone might remain in
the relationship rather than leave a partner who physically and psychologically

72. See generally, e.g., Barrett v. State, 918 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Ambrose v.
State, No. A-5112, 1995 WL 17220777 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1995); Thompson v. State, 813
S.W.2d 249 (Ark. 1991); Wonnum v. State, 942 A.2d 569 (Del. 2007); Nixon v. United States, 728
A.2d 582 (D.C. 1999); Gonzalez-Valdes v. State, 834 So. 2d 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003);
Thigpen v. State, 546 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Augustin, 63 P.3d 1097 (Haw. 2002);
Schwartz v. State, 177 P.3d 400 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008); People v. Evans, 631 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994); State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234 (Iowa 2001); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan.
1988); Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999); State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); People v. Sandoval-Ceron, No. 286985, 2010 WL 3021861 (Mich. Ct.
App. Aug. 3, 2010); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989); Lentz v. State, 604 So. 2d
243 (Miss. 1992); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d
474 (Nev. 2000); State v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235 (N.H. 1988); State v. Tierney, 813 A.2d 560 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); State v. Swavola, 840 P.2d 1238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); People v.
Wilcox, 788 N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989);
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983); State v. Goff, 942 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio 2010);
Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Moore, 695 P.2d 985 (Or. Ct. App.
1985); Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Urena, 899 A.2d
1281 (R.I. 2006); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1986); State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1, 4
(S.D. 1992); State v. Gurley, 919 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Valdez, No.
20030089-CA, WL 1017848 (Utah Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2007); State v. Swift, 844 A.2d 802 (Vt. 2004);
State v. Hendrickson, 914 P.2d 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Stewart, 719 S.E.2d 876 (W.
Va. 2011); State v. Richardson, 525 N.W.2d 378 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). See also, e.g., WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 6-1-203(b) (West 2014).
73. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033(1) (West 2014) (“Evidence that the actor was
suffering from the battered spouse syndrome shall be admissible upon the issue of whether the actor
lawfully acted in self-defense or defense of another.” (emphasis added)).
74. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-11 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14
(2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 15 (West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101 (West
2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.392 (West 2014).
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abuses her.75 In particular, “[i]f she tries to leave the relationship, she is located
and returned and the violence increases.”76 Apparently in recognition that the
psychological dynamics may also apply to others—not just to women—some
sources have started to refer to “battered spouse syndrome,”77 although the
applicability of that term is questionable when the defendant was never married
to the alleged batterer.78 In addition, at least one court has recognized an
analogous “battered child syndrome” that may apply to situations in which a
child defendant presents a claim of self-defense for using physical force against
a parent.79
Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome has been offered as relevant
to evaluating assertions of self-defense undertaken by defendants who
eventually used physical force—particularly deadly force—against the batterers
who abused them, rather than leaving the relationship before the conflict
escalated to such a situation.80 The syndrome is regarded as a form of posttraumatic stress disorder.81 The theory of battered woman syndrome posits
recurring cycles consisting of a “tension-building” phase during which the
battered woman, based on her relationship with the batterer, quickly perceives
danger signals indicating that a violent episode will occur; an “acute-explosion”
phase in which the abuse occurs; and a “loving, contrition” phase in which the
abuser gives assurances of better behavior in the future.82 Battered women tend
to retaliate against their abusers when “the cycle lapses back into phase one from
phase three” as signs of violence from the batterer start again.83
A court has explained that “[e]xpert testimony relating to battered woman’s
syndrome is germane to the jury’s assessment of the subjective honesty as well
as the objective reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that deadly force was
necessary to protect herself against death or serious bodily harm.”84 At trial, “in
determining objective reasonableness” of the defendant’s belief in the necessity
of using force, the factfinder “must view the situation from the defendant’s
perspective.”85 In particular, “[w]here ‘the circumstances’ include domestic
violence, the battered woman syndrome is relevant to the reasonableness of an
75. See, e.g., Tierney, 813 A.2d at 564‒65.
76. Stewart, 763 P.2d at 582 (citing Gail Rodwan, The Defense of Those Who Defend
Themselves, 65 MICH. B.J. 64, 66‒67 (1986)) (paraphrasing expert witness testimony).
77. See, e.g., Copeland v. Washington, 232 F.3d 969, 975‒76 (8th Cir. 2000); Weiand v. State,
732 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 1999).
78. But see State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 311‒12 (Mo. Ct. App.) (holding that the
applicability of battered spouse syndrome does not depend on the marital status of the defendant).
79. State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1334‒35 (Ohio 1998).
80. See Tierney, 813 A.2d at 566.
81. Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
82. Id. at 10.
83. Williams, 787 S.W.2d at 312 (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 70
(1979)).
84. Tierney, 813 A.2d at 566 (emphasis added).
85. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1996).
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individual’s belief” that the batterer presents an imminent danger of “death or
great bodily harm.”86 A court has noted that commentators have made an
analogy to a hostage situation, in that “the battered woman lives under longterm, life-threatening conditions in constant fear of another eruption of
violence.”87 Thus, a “battered wife is constantly in a heightened state of terror
because she is certain that one day her husband will kill her during the course of
a beating. . . . Thus from the perspective of the battered wife, the danger is
constantly ‘immediate.’”88
Jurisdictions disagree about whether battered woman syndrome and claims of
self-defense may justify a defendant’s use of force when the batterer did not
engage in immediately threatening conduct. Some courts have held that battered
woman syndrome may explain why—notwithstanding the apparent absence of
imminent danger if viewed from an outsider’s perspective—the defendant could
reasonably believe that the batterer presented an immediate threat.89 Under this
view, “the issue is not whether the danger was in fact imminent, but whether,
given the circumstances as she perceived them, the defendant’s belief was
reasonable that the danger was imminent.”90 But other courts have declared that
if the batterer did not engage in immediately threatening behavior, then the
defendant could not have reasonably believed she was in imminent danger, and
so the justification of self-defense was unavailable.91 Moreover, even if the
defendant “presents credible evidence that she is a victim of the battered woman
syndrome,” hiring a third party to kill the batterer makes a claim of self-defense
unavailable.92
III. TERRORISM: POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE
Terrorism is characterized by violence as a tool of political coercion. For
example, the federal terrorism statute contains a requirement of intent that
defines “[f]ederal crime of terrorism” as “an offense that . . . is calculated to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to
retaliate against government conduct.”93 The corresponding section of the New

86. Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 478 (Nev. 2000).
87. Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 12 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK
ON CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1986); P. ROBINSON, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES (1984)).
88. Id. at 12 n.12 (quoting Loraine Patricia Eber, The Battered Wife’s Dilemma: To Kill or To
Be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 928‒29 (1981)).
89. See, e.g., State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313‒15 (Wash. 1984) (holding that self-defense
might apply despite the fact that, after the batterer threatened to kill the defendant, the batterer was
lying on a couch when the defendant retrieved and loaded a shotgun and killed the batterer).
90. Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 12.
91. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 575‒76, 578 (Kan. 1988) (holding that selfdefense was inapplicable in the defense of a battered woman who killed her husband when he was
sleeping).
92. People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 760 (Colo. App. 1991).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A) (2012).
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York state terrorism statute provides that:
[a] person is guilty of a crime of terrorism when, with intent to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a
unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct
of a unit of government by murder, assassination or kidnapping, he or
she commits a specified offense.94
For federal prosecution of terrorism, a preliminary decision is whether to
pursue criminal charges in ordinary civilian courts within the United States or
charge the defendants as accused enemy combatants95 in military commissions
set up in the U.S. Marine Corps base in Guantanamo, Cuba.96 Civil rights
guarantees such as Miranda requirements apply more fully in the civilian
courts,97 and the Obama administration has pursued terrorism prosecutions in
that setting rather than in military commissions.98
However, the Obama administration has also been aggressively pursuing the
use of the public safety exception to justify extended questioning of terrorism
suspects before advising them of their Miranda rights.99 In 2010, FBI director
Robert Mueller testified that his agency was interpreting the public safety
exception broadly when dealing with terrorism cases.100 The FBI also stated this
policy in an internal memorandum dated October 21, 2010, advising that in
questioning terrorism suspects, agents should first “ask any and all questions that
are reasonably prompted by an immediate concern for the safety of the public or

94. N.Y. Penal Law § 490.25(1) (McKinney 2001).
95. For a discussion of the use of due process rights to contest facts allegedly justifying
detention of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510
(2004).
96. See Hartmann, supra note 5, at 221. Hartmann’s paper includes empirical data showing
that the civilian court system is the more effective forum for obtaining convictions in terrorism
prosecutions. Id. at 239. Moreover, the results of trials in the military commission system have
been notably unimpressive for the prosecution. Of the cases that went to trial rather than being
plea-bargained, only two resulted in convictions, and both were subsequently overturned by
appellate courts. Jennifer Steinhauer & Charlie Savage, U.S. Defends Prosecuting Benghazi
Suspect in Civilian Rather than Military Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/06/18/world/middleeast/us-defends-prosecuting-benghazi-suspect-in-civilian-rather-tha
n-military-court.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22R
I%3A13%22%7D&_r=1.
97. For this reason, various members of Congress—including Senator Lindsey Graham and
Congressman Trey Gowdy—have urged that terrorism suspects should be tried by military
commissions rather than by courts that enforce Miranda rights. Steinhauer & Savage, supra note
96.
98. Id.
99. Charlie Savage, Delayed Miranda Warning Ordered for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda.html?module=Search&mab
Reward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A13%22%7D.
100. Id.
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the arresting agents without advising the arrestee of his Miranda rights.”101
Thus, the memo urged agents to take advantage of what is allowed by the public
safety exception, to which the memo explicitly later refers.102 The memo stated
that the complex nature of terrorist attacks justifies “significantly more extensive
public safety interrogation without Miranda warnings than would be permissible
in an ordinary criminal case.”103 In particular, the memo advised that
interrogating un-Mirandized suspects could appropriately include “questions
about possible impending or coordinated terrorist attacks; the location, nature,
and threat posed by weapons that might pos[e] an imminent danger to the public;
and the identities, locations, and activities or intentions of accomplices who may
be plotting additional imminent attacks.”104
Also in 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder proposed that Congress should
enact a law to reduce the Miranda requirements when law enforcement agents
interrogate terrorism suspects.105 Michael McCaul, Chairman of the Homeland
Security Committee in the House of Representatives, similarly suggested that
the Miranda requirements should be changed to allow at least forty-eight hours
for questioning a suspect under the public safety exception.106 But such
legislative reduction of the Miranda rule would be invalid in light of the
Supreme Court’s holding in the Dickerson case: “In sum, we conclude that
Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede
legislatively.”107
A. The Rescue Doctrine Justifies Extended Interrogation of Un-Mirandized
Suspects When Specific, Identified Individuals are Threatened
Straightforward application of the rescue doctrine suggests that law
enforcement officers may legitimately question un-Mirandized suspects about
ongoing threats to particular individuals, and that the prosecution may use the
suspects’ responses at trial. For example, in the case of People v. Davis,108 the
California Supreme Court held that the rescue doctrine was applicable to
interrogation of a kidnapping suspect when the victim had been missing for
101. The text of the FBI memo was obtained and disclosed by the New York Times in its piece,
F.B.I. Memorandum, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25
miranda-text.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%
3A16%22%7D&_r=0.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Charlie Savage, Holder Backs a Miranda Limit for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, May 9,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/politics/10holder.html?pagewanted=all&module=
Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A13%22%7D.
106. Sabrina Siddiqui, Michael McCaul: ‘Rush to Mirandize’ Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Cost
Valuable Intelligence, HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/
04/26/michael-mccaul-mirandize-dzhokhar-tsarnaev_n_3165907.html.
107. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
108. 208 P.3d 78 (Cal. 2009).
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sixty-four days.109 The Davis court explained that such questioning was justified
because “the length of time a kidnap victim has been missing is not, by itself,
dispositive of whether a rescue is still reasonably possible.”110 Thus, the
continuing nature of a threat to an identified individual triggers the rescue
doctrine exception to the Miranda requirements. Identifying a specific victim
or potential victim tends to keep the rescue doctrine within the bounds of what
is reasonable, rather than degenerating into speculation about a general threat
that is not specifically directed.
In the context of handling suspected terrorists, the rescue doctrine should
support un-Mirandized interrogation to recover kidnapped officials, or to protect
officials who have been threatened with violence, such as kidnapping or
assassination. For example, if law enforcement officers had chosen to conduct
questioning of un-Mirandized suspects during investigation into the
assassination plot that targeted then-Senator Obama during his presidential
campaign in 2008,111 the rescue doctrine could have justified it. Sometime after
the suspects were arrested, officials stated that the suspects believed in white
supremacist ideology and discussed planning to steal guns to engage in “killing
88 people [(primarily black schoolchildren)] and beheading 14 AfricanAmericans,” according to an affidavit filed by a federal agent.112 The affidavit
also explained that the numbers eighty-eight and fourteen have special
significance “in the white power movement,” being coded references to white
supremacist slogans.113 The planned killing spree was designed to culminate
with the assassination of Obama, “the first black presidential nominee from a
major [political] party.”114 The plan for politically motivated violence that
included at least one specifically identified individual—a presidential
candidate—thus constituted a terrorist plan that could justify law enforcement
agents using the rescue doctrine exception to the Miranda requirements. The
rescue doctrine exception could have been used to question the suspects about
the same sort of items listed in the FBI memo regarding use of the public safety
exception—coordinated attacks, location of weapons, and “accomplices who
may be plotting additional imminent attacks.”115 In addition, the specificity of
the attack plans—such as the particular number of African-American victims to
be killed and the number to be beheaded—might also be enough to support the

109. Id. at 123.
110. Id.
111. For one news source summarizing the plot, see Jack Date, Feds Thwart Alleged Obama
Assassination Plot, ABC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Vote2008/
story?id=6122962.
112. Eric Lichtblau, Arrests in Plan to Kill Obama and Black Schoolchildren, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/world/americas/28iht-28plot.17300436.html
?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
113. Date, supra note 111.
114. Lichtblau, supra note 112.
115. See F.B.I. Memorandum, supra note 101.
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idea of a possible ongoing threat to the general public, and thus invoke
application of the public safety exception, at least until the suspects’ answers
dispelled the idea of such an ongoing threat.
B. By Analogy with Battered Woman Syndrome, the Course of Terrorist
Activity in the Recent Past Could Be Relevant in Determining Whether the
Public Safety Exception Applies to Interrogating Terrorism Suspects
A period of frequent and severe terrorist attacks may justify extending the
public safety exception, even if the suspect himself has been apprehended and
does not appear to pose an immediate danger to the public safety. That situation
would be analogous to claims of self-defense by sufferers of battered woman
syndrome in jurisdictions that recognize the syndrome as relevant to determining
the reasonableness of the actor’s belief that the batterer presented an imminent
danger.
An example of the use of battered woman syndrome, in a case where the
batterer might not have seemed to present an immediate threat, occurred in State
v. Allery,116 where the Washington Supreme Court determined that expert
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome should have been admissible in
support of the defendant’s theory of self-defense for shooting her estranged
husband.117 Moreover, the court stated that “[t]he jury should have been
instructed to consider the self-defense issue from the defendant’s perspective in
light of all that she knew and had experienced with the victim.”118 For a period
of several years, the defendant was abused by her husband; “[s]he suffered
periodic pistol whippings, assaults with knives, and numerous beatings from her
husband’s fists throughout the marriage.”119 He also hit her head with a tire iron,
and “[d]uring the last year of their marriage, the beatings increased in frequency
and severity.”120 The defendant started divorce proceedings and obtained a
restraining order, but when she returned to her house one night, her husband was
lying on the couch and threatened to kill her.121 The defendant unsuccessfully
tried to exit through a bedroom window, and she heard a sound that she believed
indicated her husband was getting a knife in the kitchen.122 She loaded a shotgun
in the bedroom, moved into the kitchen, and “fired the shot that killed her
husband while he remained lying on the couch.”123
Similarly, in State v. Nemeth,124 the Ohio Supreme Court held that evidence
of battered child syndrome—which is similar to battered woman syndrome—
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984).
Id. at 313‒15.
Id. at 315.
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 313‒14.
Id. at 314.
694 N.E.2d 1332 (Ohio 1998).
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was admissible for several issues, including the defendant’s contention that he
acted in self-defense when he retrieved a bow and some arrows from his
bedroom, walked into the hallway, and shot five arrows into his mother’s head
and neck when she was lying on the living room couch.125 The defendant
“testified that his mother had been abusive toward him for several years” and
she frequently engaged in excessive drinking that would result in her hitting him,
verbally threatening him, and “pounding and kicking on his bedroom door” for
hours.126 She had also cut him with a coat hanger, burned him with a cigarette,
used a stick to hit him, and threw objects at him.127 The court reasoned that the
battered child syndrome evidence was relevant for several purposes, including
determining whether the defendant “had an honest belief that he was in imminent
danger, a necessary element in the affirmative defense of self-defense.”128
Additionally, in State v. Williams,129 the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled that
the defendant should have been permitted to present a claim of self-defense, and
that battered woman syndrome evidence was admissible in support of that
claim.130 As she was leaving from an argument in which her abusive boyfriend
had hit her, the defendant used her vehicle to strike a man that she mistakenly
believed to be the boyfriend, and then turned the vehicle around to strike him
again when she saw him rise to his knees.131 The abuser had beaten the
defendant between ten and seventeen times during their five-year relationship,
and had also vandalized the defendant’s furniture and her automobile
windshield.132 The batterer had also told the defendant that “if she ever hurt him
she had better kill him, because if she didn’t he would kill her.”133 Based on this
evidence, the court found that the defendant’s theory of self-defense, based on
battered woman syndrome, should have been available at trial.134
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals likewise held in Bechtel v. State135
that testimony about battered woman syndrome should have been admissible at
the trial of a defendant who claimed self-defense in killing her husband after
being subjected to “approximately 23 battering incidents” in roughly two
years.136 The court noted the following incidents, among others: the defendant’s
husband had pounded her head against the ground and other surfaces, and the
125. Id. at 1333, 1334‒36.
126. Id. at 1333.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1336.
129. 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
130. Id. at 313.
131. Id. at 310. At the time, the defendant’s vision was impaired because her glasses fell off
when her boyfriend struck her, and she was crying as she got into the car; this led to her
misidentification of the person she struck with the car. Id.
132. Id. at 309.
133. Id. at 310.
134. Id. at 313.
135. 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
136. Id. at 6.
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defendant was treated at a hospital emergency room on three occasions,
including one involving a neck injury.137 On the day that the defendant killed
her husband, he had sexually abused her, “beat her head against the headboard”
of their bed, and threatened to kill her.138 As described by the court, after the
defendant was able to move from underneath her husband, she lit a cigarette and
prepared to smoke it, but then “she heard a gurgling sound, looked up and saw
the contorted look and glazed eyes of the deceased with his arms raised.”139 The
defendant then “reached for the gun under the bed” and shot her husband while
trying to run away from him.140
A particularly striking use of a theory of self-defense involving battered
woman syndrome occurred in State v. Leidholm,141 in which the North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a woman who had stabbed her
husband to death when he was sleeping, and remanded the case for a new trial.142
The court did not give a detailed account of the abuse that occurred before the
day of the stabbing, simply stating that “the Leidholm marriage relationship in
the end was an unhappy one, filled with a mixture of alcohol abuse, moments of
kindness toward one another, and moments of violence.”143 But on the day of
the fatal stabbing, the defendant’s husband pushed her down several times both
inside and outside their house, and he pushed her away from the telephone to
prevent her from calling law enforcement.144 Later, after defendant and her
husband went to bed and the husband fell asleep, the defendant went to the
kitchen, got a knife, and returned to the bedroom where she stabbed him; he died
minutes later.145 The court held in part that the jury instruction about self137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. at 5‒6.
140. Id. at 6.
141. 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983).
142. Id. at 813‒14. But see State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989) (holding that the
defendant “was not entitled to a jury instruction on either perfect or imperfect self-defense” because
there was no evidence that the defendant “reasonably believed herself to be confronted by
circumstances which necessitated her killing her husband to save herself from imminent death or
great bodily harm”). The Norman defendant’s husband had abused her during the final twenty
years of their marriage. Id. at 10. The abuse included his striking her, throwing objects at her,
burning her with her own cigarettes, and “throwing hot coffee on her.” Id. On the day of the
shooting, the husband again struck the defendant, burned her with a cigarette, threatened to kill her,
deprived her of food, “called her a ‘dog’ and made her lie on the floor when he lay down on the
bed.” Id. at 11. When the couple’s infant grandchild started to cry, the defendant “took [the baby]
to her mother’s house so [the baby] would not wake up her husband.” Id. The defendant then “took
a pistol from her mother’s purse,” returned to her home, and attempted to shoot her husband in the
back of his head, but the gun jammed. Id. at 9, 11. The defendant cleared the gun and then shot
her sleeping husband three times in the back of his head. Id. at 9. The final two shots were fired
when she discovered that he was still breathing after the first shot. Id. The North Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court judgment of voluntary manslaughter. Id.
143. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 813.
144. Id. at 814.
145. Id.
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defense was faulty because it referred to “reasonably prudent persons, regardless
of their sex, similarly situated” to determine whether the defendant had “the
reasonable belief that the other person was then about to kill her or do serious
bodily harm to her.”146 The court explained that under North Dakota law, the
applicable standard was not that of “a reasonably cautious person,” but rather
“what [the defendant] in good faith honestly believed and had reasonable ground
to believe was necessary for h[er] to do to protect h[er]self from apprehended
death or great bodily injury.”147 Thus, the jury should have taken into account
“the unique physical and psychological characteristics of an accused” in
determining whether the defendant acted reasonably.148
Each of these cases in which the defendants claimed self-defense featured
traumatic incidents that a batterer inflicted upon the defendant for an extended
period of time leading up to the defendant’s use of deadly force. Each case
raised a question at trial about whether—at the time of using force against the
batterer (or the person mistaken to be the batterer)—the defendant reasonably
believed such force was necessary to deal with an imminent threat posed by the
batterer. Battered woman syndrome or battered child syndrome was relevant to
determining the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in each of these cases,
where a “snapshot” summary of the moment of the defendant’s use of force
would fail to reveal the complexity of continuing incidents of battering that
culminated in the defendant using force against the batterer.
By analogy with the battered woman syndrome cases, law enforcement
officers may be justified in taking into account the events that occurred in the
time leading up to their interrogation of a suspected terrorist. For example, the
public safety exception would likely have applied if terrorism suspects were
apprehended and interrogated in the days immediately following the attacks that
the radical Islamist organization al-Qaeda launched against targets in the United
States on September 11, 2001 (9/11)—which left thousands dead149— because
the authorities could reasonably anticipate follow-up attacks by al-Qaeda or
similar groups. On the morning of 9/11, al-Qaeda operatives hijacked several
passenger airliners, crashing them into the two towers of the World Trade Center
in New York City and a wall of the Pentagon (headquarters of the U.S. military)
in Washington, D.C.150 Another hijacked airplane crashed in a field in rural
Pennsylvania, apparently as a result of passengers fighting against the
hijackers.151 By that time, the Federal Aviation Administration had stopped

146.
147.
148.
149.
2014).
150.
151.

Id. at 818.
Id.
Id.
9/11 Attacks, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks (last visited Dec. 16,
Id.
Id.
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flight operations at airports throughout the country.152 In total, more than 3,000
people died in the incidents, and approximately 10,000 were wounded.153 If any
suspects had been apprehended during what appeared to be the commission of
further terrorist activities in the days immediately following 9/11, law
enforcement officers would probably have been in the sort of “kaleidoscopic”
situation that the Quarles Court found demands immediate response and justifies
use of the public safety exception.154 Just as battered woman syndrome is a form
of post-traumatic stress disorder and can be relevant to determining whether use
of force against the batterer was based on a reasonable belief that the batterer
presented an imminent danger,155 the trauma caused by events such as the 9/11
attacks could reasonably be factored into the assessment of whether the public
safety exception applies.
A series of smaller-scale terrorist incidents might also constitute a situation in
which law enforcement would be justified in using the public safety exception.
Consider hypothetical scenario A, in which ten terrorist strikes against the
United States occurred in the four months immediately preceding apprehension
of a suspect and each of those incidents resulted in dozens of casualties. That
background would tend to render reasonable the arresting officers’ belief that
there is an immediate necessity to obtain information from the suspect in order
to protect the public from additional pending attack, because—as in a battered
woman syndrome situation—the separate attacks can be seen as a continuous
cycle of violence, thus justifying anticipation of further violence.
In contrast, consider hypothetical scenario B, in which no major terrorist
incident has occurred in the United States for several years. Those
circumstances would tend to refute law enforcement agents’ claims that they
reasonably believed it was immediately necessary to interrogate the suspect to
protect the public from further attacks. Thus, in determining whether officers
had a reasonable belief that there was an immediate necessity to obtain
information by interrogating the suspect without first administering Miranda
warnings, the severity and frequency of incidents leading up to the most recent
event are relevant.
In addition, by analogy with drug dealer cases, a suspect’s activity in a group
that is known to engage in terrorism might also be relevant to determine whether
the public safety exception applies. In United States v. Reyes,156 the court found
the public safety exception applied because the arresting officer reasonably
believed that the suspect—a heroin dealer—might be “carrying sharp objects or
firearms,” as such objects are known to be used by drug dealers.157 Similarly,
152. September 11: Chronology of Terror, CNN.COM (Sept. 12, 2001, 12:27 PM), http://
edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/.
153. 9/11 Attacks, supra note 149.
154. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 469, 656 (1984).
155. See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 6‒7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
156. 353 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2003).
157. Id. at 154.
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in United States v. Edwards,158 the public safety exception justified a detective’s
question about whether the suspect had a gun because “drug dealers are known
to arm themselves, particularly when making a sale, in order to protect
themselves, their goods and the large quantities of cash often associated with
such transactions.”159
The nature of a suspect’s participation in a group that authorities have
designated a terrorist organization may likewise be considered a factor in
determining whether the public safety exception applies. Although not
explicitly on point with this interpretation, the federal Second Circuit case
United States v. Khalil160 is at least suggestive. In Khalil, an informant told
police about two suspects who had pipe bombs that they planned to explode
soon; the suspects were motivated by political events in Palestine.161 Police
raided the suspects’ apartment, wounded both suspects during their
apprehension, handcuffed them, and took them to a hospital.162 The police then
noticed that some switches had been flipped on one of the pipe bombs, and other
officers conducted un-Mirandized questioning about that with one of the
suspects at the hospital.163 The suspect answered the questions about the bombs,
and he “was also asked whether he had planned to kill himself in the explosion,
to which he responded simply, ‘Poof.’”164 After Miranda warnings were given,
the suspect was questioned again, and he stated that “he had made the bombs,
‘want[ing] to blow up a train and kill as many Jews as possible’ because he
opposed United States support for Israel” and he gave details about the plan.165
He also asserted his association with Hamas, which the court identified as “a
terrorist organization.”166
The suspect challenged the trial court’s admission of his answer of “poof” in
response to the officers’ question about whether he meant to kill himself in the
intended bombing.167 However, the Second Circuit found that the public safety
exception applied because the question “had the potential for shedding light on
the bomb’s stability.”168

158. 885 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1989).
159. Id. at 384.
160. 214 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
161. Id. at 115.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 115‒16 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 116. The Second Circuit’s mention of Hamas as a terrorist group might have been
based on the “Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations” list maintained by the Department of
State. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T ST., http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/
des/123085.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
167. Khalil, 214 F.3d at 121.
168. Id. In the alternative, the court also declared that if the public safety exception did not
apply, then the admission of the suspect’s statement of “poof” was harmless error. Id.
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The Second Circuit’s mention of Hamas as “a terrorist organization”169
implied that a suspect’s status as an operative of such a group might help to
establish conditions for application of the public safety exception.170 That
implication became more explicit in United States v. Abdulmutallab,171 in which
one of the factors that justified applying the public safety exception was that the
suspect’s activities were “on behalf of al-Qaeda.”172 Deciding to delay Miranda
warnings based on a suspect’s affiliation with a particular group might raise
concerns about First Amendment protections for freedom of speech and freedom
of association.173 But judges have found no violation of those First Amendment
provisions in another context addressing support for terrorist organizations—
namely, legislative prohibitions on funding for terrorist groups.174 Similarly,
First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom of association might also be
undisturbed by questioning aimed at protecting the public safety—prompted in
part by the suspect’s activity in an organization that government agencies have
named a terrorist group.
Although not an exact match, some correlation can be made between the three
phases asserted in battered woman syndrome theory and some general stages of
terrorist activity. The “tension-building” phase of battered woman syndrome,
characterized by danger signals foreshadowing a violent episode,175 suggests a

169. Id. at 116.
170. In fact, in distinguishing the situation of the surviving Boston Marathon bombing suspect
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev from that of the “underwear bomber” case involving Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, the lawyers for Tsarnaev specifically noted that Abdulmutallab “‘claimed to be
acting on behalf of al-Qaeda,’” which raised a more serious possibility of additional attacks in
Abdulmutallab’s circumstances. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Statements at 14, United States v.
Tsarnaev, No. 13-CR-10200-GAO (D. Mass May 7, 2014) (quoting United States v.
Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2011)), available at
http://c.o0bg.com/rw/Boston/2011-020/2014/05/07/BostonGlobe.com/Metro/Graphics/tsarnaev_
motion.pdf.
171. No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2011).
172. Id. at *6. The Abdulmutallab case is discussed further in Part IV.A., infra.
173. U.S. CONST. amend. I; First Amendment: An Overview, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment (last visited Aug. 30, 2014); see also Roberts v.
U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622‒29 (1984) (holding that the Minnesota Human Rights Act’s ban
against discrimination on the basis of sex did not violate the First Amendment’s “freedom of
expressive association” for the United States Jaycees’ selection of members); Police Dep’t of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (holding that a city ordinance regulating picketing near
schools violated the First Amendment right to free speech by making “an impermissible distinction
between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing”).
174. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 39‒40 (2010) (holding that blocking
funding for a designated terrorist group under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012) did not violate freedom
of speech or freedom of association when the statute prohibited material support for terrorist
groups); Islamic Am. Relief Agency (IARA-USA) v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(finding that prohibiting funding of a designated terrorist group under 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701‒1707
(2012) did not violate freedom of association).
175. Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
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comparison to increases in “terrorist chatter,”176 terrorist group communications
observed by government intelligence agencies. Of course, the “acute-explosion”
phase of battered woman syndrome, in which violent episodes occur,177 is
analogous to an actualized terrorist incident such as occurred in the 9/11 attacks.
Battered woman syndrome’s “loving, contrition” phase, during which the
batterer expresses remorse and promises better behavior in the future,178 does
not have an exact correspondence to a stage of terrorist activity; however, both
individual victims of batterers and nation-state victims of terrorism may
experience periods of calm within an ongoing cycle of recurring violence.
Battered woman syndrome thus offers insights into situations of self-defense that
might be useful in determining whether, by analogy, the public safety exception
should apply to law enforcement agents’ questioning of suspected terrorists.
IV. INVOCATION OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION DURING INVESTIGATIONS
OF RECENT TERRORISM INCIDENTS HAS BEEN JUSTIFIED—SOMETIMES
This section examines and critiques the way that the public safety exception
has been invoked during interrogation of suspects in some of the most highly
publicized terrorism cases in recent years. Considerations include the scope of
questioning, the presence or absence of information linking the suspect to
terrorist groups, and whether the suspect actually invoked his rights.
A. The “Underwear Bomber” a.k.a. “Christmas Day Bomber”
In August of 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab journeyed to Yemen to
participate in the activities of a group affiliated with al-Qaeda.179 He agreed to
perpetrate a suicide bombing that would take place on an airplane in U.S.
airspace.180 On December 25, 2009, Abdulmutallab boarded a flight to go from
Amsterdam to Detroit while wearing a non-metal bomb (that could slip past
airport security) in his underwear.181 But when Abdulmutallab attempted to
detonate the bomb as the airplane approached Detroit, the effect was smaller
than he anticipated:
The result was a single, loud pop, which other passengers described as
sounding like a firecracker. The explosive device did not work as
intended, and caused only a large fireball around Abdulmutallab and
then a fire coming out of Abdulmutallab’s pants, igniting the

176. For an account of action taken in response to an increase in “terrorist chatter,” see Dan
Roberts & Robert Booth, NSA Defenders: Embassy Closures Followed Pre-9/11 Levels of
‘Chatter’, GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2013, 3:48 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/04/
nsa-us-embassy-closures-terrorist-threat.
177. Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 10.
178. Id.
179. United States v. Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d 891, 895 (6th Cir. 2014).
180. Id.
181. Id.
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carpeting, walls, and seat. A number of passengers restrained
Abdulmutallab and attempted to put the fire out.182
After the airplane landed, Abdulmutallab was transported to a hospital for
treatment of his injuries.183
At the hospital, an FBI agent questioned Abdulmutallab for approximately
fifty minutes.184 The agent knew the circumstances of Abdulmutallab having
tried to detonate the bomb.185 Those facts—not just the circumstances that
existed at the time the suspect was hospitalized—were contemplated by the
federal District Court when considering the suspect’s motion to suppress the
statements he made in response to the interrogation at the hospital.186 As argued
above, this sort of use of the suspect’s past actions bears a striking resemblance
to contemplating a batterer’s course of conduct in deciding whether a sufferer of
battered woman syndrome reasonably took action in self-defense. The
investigating agents also knew of the suspect’s “self-proclaimed association
with al-Qaeda and . . . the group’s past history of large, coordinated plots and
attacks,” and so they “feared that there could be additional, imminent aircraft
attacks in the United States and elsewhere in the world.”187 The questioning at
the hospital was aimed at uncovering “where [the suspect] traveled, when he had
traveled, how, and with whom; the details of the explosive device; the details
regarding the bomb-maker, including where [the suspect] had received the
bomb; his intentions in attacking Flight 253; and who else might be planning an
attack.”188 The court ruled that the public safety exception applied,189 finding
that “[e]very question sought to identify any other potential attackers and to
prevent another potential attack,” and that the suspect’s responses provided
“information that helped the agents to determine where to go next and
investigate if anyone else might be planning to or was already in the process of
carrying a similar device on an aircraft.”190
Because of the risk of further impending attacks, the nature of the questions
asked at the hospital, especially those inquiring about the bomb and the
possibility of additional incidents of similar devices being carried onto airplanes,
could be justified as having been—in the language of Quarles—“reasonably
prompted by a concern for the public safety.”191 In further compliance with the
scope of the public safety exception, after the agents who questioned
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 10-20005, 2011 WL 4345243, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 16, 2011).
185. Id.
186. Id. at *6.
187. Id. at *1.
188. Id. at *2.
189. Id. at *6
190. Id. at *2.
191. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
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Abdulmutallab obtained enough information to protect the public, they
“concluded their interview and immediately passed that information on to other
law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide, further underscoring that
it was obtained for purposes of public safety, to deal with other possible
threats.”192
Before the suspect’s trial could reach the point at which his un-Mirandized
statements would have been introduced into evidence, he entered a plea of guilty
to various terrorism charges and related crimes and was sentenced to four terms
of life imprisonment, three terms of imprisonment for 240 months, and one term
of imprisonment for thirty years.193
B. The “Times Square Bomber”
In the early evening of May 1, 2010,194 a vehicle parked at the curb in Times
Square, New York City with “its engine running and its hazard lights on” began
to emit smoke.195 The vehicle contained a bomb consisting of “three propane
tanks, two gallons of petrol and a load of fertilizer, with fireworks and some
cheap alarm clocks as a trigger.”196 The vehicle contained “more than 100
pounds of fertilizer, but not the kind that would explode.”197 Apparently, the
would-be bomber mistakenly used the wrong type of fertilizer; if the same type
that was “used by Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh” had been present
in the vehicle in Times Square, then it “would have had the force of more than
100 pounds of TNT.”198
Just over fifty-three hours after the bomb failed to detonate,199 investigators
went to New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport and arrested the suspect, Faisal
Shahzad, as he was onboard an airplane that was scheduled to depart for

192. Abdulmutallab, 2011 WL 4345243 at *6. The Abdulmutallab situation was thus
distinguishable from that in United States v. Rumble, 714 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390, 392‒93 (N.D.N.Y.
2010), where the prosecution’s argument that the public safety exception applied was refuted by,
inter alia, the fact that officers who interrogated the suspect did not convey information about traps
and explosives at his home to the officers who entered the residence.
193. United States v. Abdulmutallab, 739 F.3d 891, 898‒99 (6th Cir. 2014).
194. Tom Hays & Larry Neumeister, Would be Times Square Bomber Sentenced, Warns of
More Attacks, DENV. POST (Oct. 6, 2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_16262681.
195. Al Baker & William K. Rashbaum, Police Find Car Bomb in Times Square, N.Y. TIMES
(May 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/nyregion/02timessquare.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0.
196. Times Square Bombing: Trail that led to Faisal Shahzad, GUARDIAN (May 5, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/05/times-square-bombing-faisal-shahzad.
197. Richard Esposito, Pierre Thomas & Brian Ross, Authorities have Identified Person of
Interest in Times Square Bomb Attempt, ABC NEWS (May 4, 2010), http://abcnews.go.
com/Blotter/times-square-car-bomber-police-release-video-suspect/story?id=10534834.
198. Id.
199. William K. Rashbaum & Al Baker, Smoking Car to an Arrest in 53 Hours, N.Y. TIMES
(May 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/nyregion/05tictoc.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0.
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Dubai.200 Shahzad is a U.S. citizen originally from Pakistan.201 Soon after his
arrest in New York, Pakistani government authorities “detained 13 people in
their [concurrent] investigation of the attempted [Times Square] bombing.”202
On May 5, 2010, “Pakistan’s foreign minister . . . claimed the failed bomb attack
in Times Square could be a direct response to US action against the Taliban.”203
Shahzad was initially questioned without Miranda warnings.204 Reports do
not indicate how much time was involved in that initial interrogation.
Prosecutors stated that Shahzad later “was advised of and waived his Miranda
rights to remain silent.”205 Shahzad was reported to have “extensively
cooperated with authorities, providing many hours of information”206 in the
nearly two weeks that elapsed between his arrest and his meeting with a
lawyer.207 However, according to a reporter, Shahzad claimed during his
sentencing hearing that “‘[o]n the second day of [his] arrest, [he] asked for the
Miranda [sic],’ . . . referring to the required notification of his right to
counsel.”208 He further told the court that “‘the F.B.I. denied it to [him] for two
weeks’ and threatened his wife and children.”209 But during the hearing, no one
responded to Shahzad’s allegations, and his attorney “had no comment on the
statements after the hearing.”210
At some point in response to the questioning conducted by law enforcement,
Shahzad told investigators that during a return visit to Pakistan, he received
training in the use of explosives with the group Tehrik-e-Taliban, which is “a
militant extremist group.”211 That group is on the U.S. Department of State’s
list of foreign terrorist organizations.212 While pleading guilty to “a 10-count
indictment” encompassing several terrorism-related charges, Shahzad

200. Times Square Suspect Had Explosives Training, Documents Say, CNN (May 5, 2010),
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/04/new.york.car.bomb/index.html.
201. Patricia Hurtado & Justin Blum, Times Square Bomb Suspect is Cooperating, Officials
Say, BLOOMBERG (May 4, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2010-05-03/new-yorkcity-plans-to-deploy-more-cameras-mayor-says.html.
202. Id.
203. Chris McGreal, Faisal Shahzad Co-operates as FBI Explores Links to Islamist Groups,
GUARDIAN (May 5, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/05/faisal-shahzad-pakis
tan-islamist-groups.
204. Hurtado & Blum, supra note 201.
205. Chad Bray, Bomber Pleads Guilty in Plot, WALL ST. J. (updated June 22, 2010, 12:10
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704895204575320581980487938.
206. Id.
207. Clay Flaherty, NYC Car Bomber Sentenced to Life in Prison, JURIST (Oct. 5, 2011, 12:00
AM), http://jurist.org/thisday/2011/10/nyc-car-bomber-sentenced-to-life-in-prison.php.
208. Michael Wilson, Shahzad Gets Life Term for Times Square Bombing Attempt, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/nyregion/06shahzad.html.
209. Id. There does not appear to be any other source corroborating Shahzad’s allegations.
210. Id.
211. Bray, supra note 205.
212. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 166.
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condemned the presence of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as
well as the use of “unmanned drone strikes against terror suspects.”213
Initial un-Mirandized questioning of Shahzad appears to be justified in light
of the threat that his bomb could have created for the residents of New York
City. Especially in light of Abdulmutallab’s “underwear bombing” attempt just
a few months before that, and Abdulmutallab’s confessed link to the terrorist
group al-Qaeda, authorities could plausibly perceive a need to question Shahzad
to discover the scale of any similar plot in the Times Square incident. For
sufferers of battered woman syndrome, recent attacks heighten the perception of
warning signs pointing to further attacks;214 a similar perception could justify a
sense of a need for immediate information to deal with a series of terrorism
incidents. However, Shahzad’s allegation that agents denied his request for a
lawyer and threatened his family215 is troubling. The public safety exception
simply does not allow investigators to continue questioning a suspect in spite of
his request for a lawyer,216 and no legal doctrine justifies threatening a suspect’s
family in order to obtain his compliance during questioning. Thus, if Shahzad’s
claims about the interrogation were found to be credible, then his statements
made in response to being denied a lawyer and his family being threatened would
have been inadmissible for his criminal trial. However, the absence of comment
by anyone at the hearing—including Shahzad’s attorney217—does not lend
credibility to his claims. Rather than go to trial, Shahzad pleaded guilty to
federal terrorism charges and related crimes, with resulting judgments of six life
terms, two ten-year terms, and two twenty-year terms.218
C. The Boston Marathon Bombing219
On the afternoon of April 15, 2013, two bombs exploded along the final
section of the Boston Marathon course.220 Investigators found “that the bombs
were probably fashioned from pressure cookers, filled with nails and ball
bearings to increase the carnage.”221 The bombing killed three people and

213. Bray, supra note 205.
214. See Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
215. Wilson, supra note 208.
216. See infra footnotes 245‒259 and accompanying text.
217. Wilson, supra note 208.
218. United States v. Shahzad, No. 10 Cr. 541 (MGC)-1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010) (judgment
in a criminal case).
219. Proceedings for the Boston Marathon bombing case are ongoing at the time of the writing
of this Article.
220. Jenna Russell & Thomas Farragher, 102 Hours in Pursuit of Marathon Suspects, BOSTON
GLOBE (Apr. 28, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04/28/bombreconstruct/VbSZ
hzHm35yR88EVmVdbDM/story.html.
221. Id.
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wounded more than 260 others.222 Based on video recordings of the crowd at
the marathon, the FBI released photographs of two suspects who turned out to
be brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.223 During a shootout on April
19, 2013, Tamerlan (the older brother) was killed and Dzhokhar was wounded;
Dzhokhar was eventually arrested that evening.224 Apparently, Dzhokhar had
written a note along the wall of a boat where he hid from authorities before his
arrest; a news source described it as “part manifesto, part suicide note and part
justification for the killing and maiming of innocent civilians.”225 A media
source stated that the boat message was “scrawled with a marker on the interior
wall of the cabin” and “said the bombings were retribution for U.S. military
action in Afghanistan and Iraq, and called the Boston victims ‘collateral damage’
in the same way Muslims have been in the American-led wars.”226 Dzhokhar
received emergency surgery for his wounds on the same day he was
apprehended,227 and the government announced that he would be interrogated
without being advised of his Miranda rights.228
The interrogation took place during April 20‒22.229 Including time for breaks,
the questioning was conducted for more than twenty-seven hours.230 Dzhokhar
was unable to speak because of his injuries and surgery, so he wrote his answers
to the agents’ questions.231 According to the defense, his written responses
stated that there were no additional bombs, and he made repeated requests for
rest and for a lawyer, writing “the word ‘lawyer’ ten times, sometimes circling
it.”232 The FBI report of the interview indicates that Dzhokhar was told he
needed to answer questions before he would be allowed to speak with a lawyer,
in order “to ensure that the public safety was no longer in danger from other
individuals, devices, or otherwise.”233 The defense also stated that “[t]he FBI
report and notes make[] it clear that the interrogation was wide-ranging,
covering everything from how and where the bombs were made to his beliefs
222. Remembering the Tragedy: Timeline of Events in the Boston Marathon Bombing,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/14/bostonmarathon-timeline_n_5145615.html.
223. Russell & Farragher, supra note 220.
224. Remembering the Tragedy, supra note 222.
225. Boston Bombings Suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Left Note in Boat He Hid In, Sources Say,
CBSNEWS (May 16, 2013, 4:21 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/boston-bombings-suspectdzhokhar-tsarnaev-left-note-in-boat-he-hid-in-sources-say/.
226. Id.
227. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Statements, supra note 170, at 2.
228. Interrogators Wait to Query—But Not Mirandize—Wounded Bomb Suspect, CBSNEWS
(Apr. 12, 2013, 11:53 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/interrogators-wait-to-query-but-notmirandize-wounded-bomb-suspect/.
229. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Statements, supra note 170, at 2‒3.
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id. at 4.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 5.
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about Islam and U.S. foreign policy, as well as his sports activities, future career
goals, and school history.”234 During interrogation, Dzhokhar disclosed to law
enforcement agents that in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, he
and his brother had decided to drive to New York City to bomb Times Square.235
Finally, the day after the first criminal charges were filed in the case, a federal
magistrate judge presented the charges to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in the hospital and
gave him the Miranda warnings.236 By that time, he “had been in custody for
more than 60 hours,” which is reportedly the longest period for a criminal
suspect to be held without being advised of his Miranda rights.237 He “stopped
speaking as soon as his rights were read to him.”238
The prosecution eventually filed a total of thirty counts of federal terrorism
charges and related crimes against Dzhokhar.239 In response to the defendant’s
motion to suppress the statements made in the hospital, the prosecution stated
that “[i]n light of the history of coordinated terrorist attacks (and planned
attacks) such as the ones in Mumbai, India, Times Square, the New York subway
system, and on September 11, the FBI had a duty to be investigate [sic] whether
any additional attacks were imminent.”240 This framing of the scope of the
problem—examining a series of past incidents of violence (and attempted
violence) in order to justify recent action taken against the perpetrator of the
incidents—bears a striking resemblance to the use of battered woman syndrome
in the context of self-defense, as described above.
The case docket shows that in spite of initially opposing the defendant’s
motion to suppress the use of his un-Mirandized statements, the prosecution later
indicated it would not use Dzhokhar’s statements; as a result, the District Court
dismissed without prejudice the defendant’s motion for suppression of the
statements.241 However, if the prosecution had tried to introduce into evidence
234. Id.
235. Greg Botelho & Josh Levs, Boston Bombing Suspects Planned Times Square Attack,
Bloomberg Says, CNN (Apr. 26, 2013, 10:54 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/04/25/us/bostonattack/index.html.
236. Devlin Barrett, Siobhan Gorman & Tamer El-Ghobashy, Judge Made Call to Advise
Suspect of Rights, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2013, 7:40 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887323789704578444940173125374.
237. Meredith Clark, Now Charged, Boston Suspect Was Longest Held Without Miranda
Rights, MSNBC (Apr. 21, 2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/up-with-steve-kornacki/nowcharged-boston-suspect-was-longest-held.
238. Erin Fuchs, Judge Insisted on Miranda Rights for Boston Suspect and FBI ‘Was Not
Happy’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 25, 2013, 5:08 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/judgemirandized-dzhokhar-tsarnaev-2013-4.
239. United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-CR-10200-GAO-1 (D. Mass June 27, 2013) (criminal
docket).
240. Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Statements at 1, United States v.
Tsarnaev, No. 13-CR-10200-GAO (D. Mass May 21, 2014), available at http://theboston
marathonbombings.weebly.com/uploads/2/4/2/6/24264849/thebostonmarath_-1-.pdf.
241. Docket entry 612, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-CR-10200-GAO (D. Mass Oct. 20,
2014). See also Victoria Liberty, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Case: The Shortest Status Conference Ever,

644

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 64:613

the statements that Dzhokhar wrote when he was interrogated in the hospital, a
couple of matters should have rendered at least some of those statements
inadmissible.
First, the wide-ranging interrogation went beyond what is allowed under the
public safety exception. Pursuant to Quarles, the public safety exception applies
only when there is an immediate necessity to obtain information to protect the
officers or the public.242 As noted above, an internal memorandum of the FBI
states that the public safety exception justifies inquiries such as “questions about
possible impending or coordinated terrorist attacks; the location, nature, and
threat posed by weapons that might post [sic] an imminent danger to the public;
and the identities, locations, and activities or intentions of accomplices who may
be plotting additional imminent attacks.”243 Answers to the questions that agents
asked about the bombs that the Tsarnaev brothers used might have been
admissible if the prosecution could show that the information was relevant to
determining whether they had left other bombs that posed an immediate threat
to the public. However, the questions regarding Dzhokhar’s views “about Islam
and U.S. foreign policy, as well as his sports activities, future career goals, and
school history”244 do not relate to an immediate threat, so the public safety
exception would not have made his answers on those topics admissible for the
prosecution’s use at trial.
Moreover, Tsarnaev invoked his right to a lawyer even before he was
Mirandized. As the defense correctly observed, the Supreme Court has not
authorized continued questioning of a suspect after he has invoked his right to
counsel.245 Instead, in Edwards v. Arizona,246 the Court held that “an accused, .
. . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police.”247 Furthermore, the circumstances
of Dzhokhar’s interrogation match those described in the pre-Miranda case of
Escobedo v. Illinois,248 in which the Supreme Court found the police committed
a violation of the Sixth Amendment when they questioned a suspect, refused his
request to speak with his lawyer, and did not advise him of his right to remain
silent.249 The Escobedo Court thus ruled that the statements the suspect made to

FREEDOM BULL. (Oct. 20, 2014, 9:38 PM), http://thefreedombulletin.com/2014/10/dzhokhartsarnaev-case-the-shortest-status-conference-ever/ (last visited May 10, 2015).
242. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 469, 655‒56 (1984).
243. See F.B.I. Memorandum, supra note 101.
244. Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Statements, supra note 170, at 5.
245. Id. at 14.
246. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
247. Id. at 484‒85.
248. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
249. Id. at 491.
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the police during the interrogation were not admissible against him at the
subsequent criminal trial.250
Neither Quarles nor other Supreme Court opinions permit continued
interrogation after a suspect requests a lawyer.251 The public safety exception—
when it applies at all—allows only for a delay in informing a suspect of his
Miranda rights.252 As discussed above in connection with the case of Edwards,
the authorities are not permitted to violate rights that the suspect has actually
invoked.253 The Boston Marathon bombing prosecutors nevertheless argued at
first that the statements obtained during Tsarnaev’s interrogation were
admissible pursuant to the federal Ninth Circuit case of United States v.
DeSantis254 and its subsequent line of decisions.255 In the DeSantis case, the
court held that the public safety exception applied to questioning about the
location of weapons in the suspect’s apartment, even if the suspect had “asked
to call his lawyer as soon as the inspectors entered the apartment,” and the police
did not permit him to do so.256 However, the DeSantis court relied on the
Quarles Court’s characterization of the Miranda rule as a mere “prophylactic”
measure to protect criminal suspects’ rights.257 As explained above, the
subsequent Supreme Court case of Dickerson held that Miranda had announced
a Constitutional rule, not merely prophylactic guidelines.258 Thus, the
prosecution’s reliance on the DeSantis line of cases is rather dubious, and any
answers that Dzhokhar gave in response to questions that were asked after he
first requested a lawyer would probably have been inadmissible at trial.259

250. Id.
251. Id. at 491‒92.
252. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 469, 655‒56 (1984).
253. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484‒85 (1981).
254. 870 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
255. Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Statements, supra note 240, at 1 (citing
United States v. Mobley, 40 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. DeSantis, 870 F.2d 536 (9th
Cir. 1989); Trice v. United States, 662 A.2d 891 (D.C. 1995)). Notably, all of those cases cited by
the prosecution were decided before the Supreme Court case Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 444 (2000), which held that the Miranda case had announced a constitutional rule rather than
merely prophylactic measures aimed at safeguarding the rights of criminal suspects.
256. DeSantis, 870 F.2d at 537. The parties disagreed on whether the suspect had made the
request to speak with his lawyer, and in its review of the case, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the case
based on the suspect’s version of the incident. Id. at 538. After federal marshals advised him of
his Miranda rights, the suspect “asked if he would be going to court.” Id. at 537. Upon receiving
an affirmative answer, “he asked if he could change his clothes” and stated that the clothing was in
a nearby bedroom. Id. The marshals then asked about whether the bedroom contained any
weapons, and the suspect stated that a gun was on a closet shelf. Id.
257. Id. at 540‒41.
258. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
259. For a contrary view, see Joanna Wright, Applying Miranda’s Public Safety Exception to
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev: Restricting Criminal Procedure Rights by Expanding Judicial Exceptions, 113
COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 136, 138 (2013) (“It seems highly probable, if not inevitable, that a court
will admit Tsarnaev’s un-Mirandized statements based on the [public safety exception].”).
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On April 8, 2015, the jury convicted Dzhokar on all thirty counts of which he
was charged, and on May 15, 2015, the jury delivered its verdict of the death
penalty.260
V. CONCLUSION
In creating the public safety exception to the Miranda rule, the Supreme Court
drew an implicit analogy between the criminal procedure role of police during
interrogation of suspects under dangerous circumstances and the role of criminal
defendants utilizing justifications of self-defense and defense of others. The
comparison is especially instructive when applied to cases involving the
interrogation of terrorism suspects. Just as battered woman syndrome can
extend the range of circumstances in which the self-defense doctrine applies, a
recent history of heightened terrorist activity could extend the breadth of the
public safety exception at a particular time; conversely, a recent history of
reduced terrorist activity could diminish the breadth of the public safety
exception for a particular period.
In considering claims of self-defense based on battered woman syndrome, a
crucial focus is whether the defendant reasonably believed that the batterer
presented an imminent danger based on the history of violence that the batterer
had perpetrated upon the defendant.261 The trauma experienced by the defendant
has a bearing on the reasonableness of the defendant’s perception of imminent
danger.262
Similarly, the applicability of the public safety exception depends on whether
law enforcement agents could reasonably believe that there was an immediate
necessity to protect themselves or the public from danger posed by the suspect
or the suspect’s possible accomplices.263 In terrorism cases, that inquiry can take
into account the recent history of terrorist activities—which has a bearing on the
extent to which “our body politic has been traumatized”264—and its influence on
the reasonableness of believing that un-Mirandized questioning is needed to deal
with an immediate threat to the safety of law enforcement officers and the
general public.
Thus, both self-defense under conditions of battered woman syndrome and
the public safety exception under conditions of terrorist threat can invoke
260. Jury Verdict, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-CR-10200-GAO (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2015);
Milton J. Valencia, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Gets Death Penalty for Placing Marathon Bomb, BOSTON
GLOBE (May 15, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/05/15/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-death
-penalty-sentencing-jury-boston-marathon-bombing/canMEfLmeQJxQ4rFU0sERJ/story.html?ho
otPostID=585e84a4950b0618fd31dbded2dcaf0c; Michael McLaughlin, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
Sentenced to Death, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2015/05/15/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-sentenced_n_7283680.html?utm_hp_ref=politics&ir=Politics.
261. Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474 (Nev. 2000).
262. Id.
263. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984).
264. I am indebted to Professor Sue Liemer for this phrasing.
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dynamic histories of violent interaction, rather than relying on a static
“snapshot” view of a single moment in time. Applying this perspective offers
courts that may be struggling to come to terms with the boundaries of the public
safety exception in terrorism cases the guidance of the defined and developed
body of law addressing battered woman syndrome.
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